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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I examine the 2011–12 federal budget measure to strengthen child 
support compliance in light of gendered assessments of child support reform, 
particularly those that identify an emphasis on men’s financial autonomy and the 
buttressing of men’s financial authority beyond the couple relationship. By changing 
the way non-resident (payer) parent income is calculated for those who fail to lodge 
tax returns, the government aims to save $78.7 million over four years, with savings 
to be recouped directly from increased child support assessments and decreased 
Family Tax Benefits to resident (payee) parents. Given that 87 per cent of child 
support payers are men, this reform unintentionally legitimises men’s non-
compliance with the Australian Tax Office by circumventing the tax system in 
determining payer income. At the same time, women and children stand to bear 
indirect financial costs as they face increased reliance on their ex-partner for financial 
support—a move that increases men’s financial authority over women and children 
beyond the couple relationship. 
Dr Kay Cook <kay.cook@rmit.edu.au> is a Vice-Chancellor’s Senior Research Fellow in the 
Centre for Applied Social Research at RMIT University. Her work examines how gender interests 
are represented in social policies. She recently led an ARC Discovery project that examined the 
health implications of irregular child support payments and an ARC Linkage project that 
examined women’s experiences of welfare to work requirements. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I examine a recent change to Australia’s child support policy, enacted 
during the federal budget process of 2011–12. I do so in order to identify the 
different gender interests that are served by recent child support reform processes in 
general and this budget measure in particular. I argue that this reform has produced 
and reinforces existing gendered consequences of what might be regarded as an 
administrative process. I suggest that while the direct financial impact on women is 
minimal, the indirect financial impacts may substantially change women’s financial 
position. In addition, such changes, when considered within the broader child 
support context, reflect differences in men’s and women’s financial autonomy vis-à-
vis the state, and their respective control over money within and across households. 
Child support refers to money due to children from their liable parent following the 
breakdown in the parental relationship or the birth of a child to parents who are not 
in a couple relationship. Child support typically refers to a regular cash transfer and is 
exclusive of other forms of ‘spousal’ or ‘matrimonial’ support (International Network 
of Child Support Scholars 2012). In Australia, payment liabilities are calculated on 
the basis of each parent’s income, how much it costs to raise a child and the 
percentage of care each parent provides (Child Support Agency 2009). Each parent’s 
income is based on their taxable income minus a self-support amount. 
The child support system in Australia affects approximately 1.5 million separated 
parents and 1.1 million children (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011a). Of these 
parents, approximately 87 per cent of resident parents are women (Child Support 
Agency 2010a); indicating the deeply gendered nature of caring for children in society. 
With respect to the income of the child support parent population, the most recently 
published figures (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and 
Community Affairs 2003) reported that in 2003, 74 per cent of recipient parents had 
an annual income of less than $20,000; whereas 57 per cent of payers had incomes 
between $10,000 and $50,000 per annum. 
For low-income payee parents, the 103,952 single parents in receipt of Parenting 
Payment Single benefits (Department of Human Services 2012) are compelled to 
seek child support if they wish to receive Family Tax Benefits above the base rate 
(Centrelink 2011a). Family Tax Benefit (FTB) payments are cash transfers that 
provide financial assistance to families in relation to the costs of raising a child 
(Department of Human Services 2012). FTB payments comprise two parts: Part A 
(FTB(A)) is an income-tested payment paid for each child; Part B is a further 
income-tested payment provided to single parents and families with one main 
income. Only FTB(A) is affected by the budget measure under analysis here. 
The 2011–12 budget was announced and promoted as a budget to reduce 
government spending (Swan 2011). One measure that was introduced was a change 
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in the way some child support payers’ income is calculated when they have not filed a 
tax return for the previous two years or more, to more accurately reflect their actual 
income and provide more child support to payee parents and their children 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2011a). As the Commonwealth (2011a, p. 197) 
described, ‘this change will increase the average rate of Child Support payments, 
reducing Child Support recipients’ FTB entitlements, which will result in savings of 
$78.7 million over four years’. I argue that given the gendered nature of previous 
Australian child support reform processes and outcomes (Cook & Natalier 2012, 
2013; Smyth & Henman 2010), a detailed, feminist examination of this most recent 
reform is also required. 
Accordingly, I examine the federal government’s budget measure in light of feminist 
analyses of family law reform processes (Bacchi 1999; Boyd 2003, 2004; Boyd & 
Young 2002; Collier 1994, 2006; Fehlberg & Maclean 2009; Graycar 2000, 2005; 
James 2005), particularly those that have identified men’s financial autonomy as a key 
consideration in the recent child support reform process (Cook & Natalier 2013). In 
doing so, I identify how the administrative processes of the child support scheme, 
and this budget measure therein, prioritise men’s financial autonomy while at the 
same time increasing the regulation of women’s finances. In addition, this most 
recent child support policy reform inadvertently buttresses men’s authority over 
women’s finances after relationship dissolution. 
The focus on men’s financial autonomy and authority is referenced to socio-legal 
constructions of male financial control and authority in the domestic and political 
spheres (Collier 2010; Diduck 1995) and normative assumptions regarding women’s 
dependence on a male breadwinner within the nuclear family and the resultant 
authority of the breadwinner therein (Gerhard 2001; Gittins 1993; Vogler 1998; 
Yeatman 1990). Given that the vast majority of child support payers are men (Child 
Support Agency 2010a), post-separation, child support policy rightly enforces father’s 
financial responsibility for children (Collier 2010; Diduck 1995). However, by 
enforcing father’s financial responsibility for children, child support policy also 
promotes men’s financial authority over the family that extends beyond the couple 
relationship as men have an ongoing role in providing (or withholding) necessary 
income. Within the Australian context, they can also decide how up to 30 per cent of 
their child support payments will be spent. 
Here, I assert than men’s ‘choice’ regarding how they participate in the child support 
process is primary. Building on Diduck’s (1995) depiction of men’s family formation 
and financial support as a ‘choice’, I argue that the current child support system 
perpetuates men’s discretion. As Kristin Natalier and others (Cook & Natalier 2013; 
Natalier & Hewitt 2010) state elsewhere, men’s choice to support their family post-
separation may be revisited or contested. As Natalier and I have argued previously, 
‘at separation or divorce a father may decide to withdraw their financial contribution, 
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they may decide to continue it or they may decide to continue paying with caveats on 
how the money is to be spent; in each of these scenarios, a fathers’ intent remains the 
core of the issue’ (Cook & Natalier 2013, p. 31). 
Child support in Australia: Developments and critiques 
While the child support system has had a long and controversial history of reviews 
and reforms, in this account I focus only on the most recent reforms that were 
initiated by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and 
Community Affairs (2003) inquiry into child custody which called for a Ministerial 
Taskforce review of the child support system. The Ministerial Taskforce on Child 
Support (2005) made a number of recommendations, which were taken up in policy 
in three stages between 2006 and 2008, and contextualise the most recent budget 
measure. 
Stage one changes came into effect on 1 July 2006 and consisted of modifications to 
the way child support is calculated. These changes included: the indexing of 
minimum payments to the Consumer Price Index; child support waivers for payer 
parents on income support who have contact with their children; and caps on 
maximum child support payments. Another important reform was the increase in the 
percentage of child support that payers can provide directly to children from 25 per 
cent to 30 per cent of their total liability (Child Support Agency 2009). This change, 
where child support payments can be ‘earmarked’ for particular items, is important 
for all women but especially women affected by the budget measure reviewed here, 
as will be discussed below. 
Stage two changes were largely administrative and began on 1 January 2007. New 
measures included: greater resources for agency staff, staff training and quality 
control (Caruana 2007); an independent review of child support decisions by the 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal; a simplified relationship between the courts and the 
Child Support Scheme; more time for single parents to agree on parenting 
arrangements before their FTB(A) was affected; and improved arrangements for 
parents (that is, fathers) who dispute child paternity. 
Stage three changes were implemented on 1 July 2008 and significantly altered the 
way child support is negotiated and calculated. Parents were afforded greater 
opportunities to negotiate their child support arrangements privately and the new 
formula took into account both parents’ income as opposed to only the non-resident 
parent’s, which had been the case under the old scheme. The assessment of both 
parents’ income is another step towards the ‘de-gendering’ of child support policy as 
women’s finances are folded in with the finances of men, as if both compete in the 
labour market on a level playing field. As Australian research has shown, women take 
on the majority of domestic and care-giving responsibilities both within couple 
relationships and when separated (Baxter 2006, 2010; Chesters, Baxter & Western 
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2009; Craig & Mullan 2010). Such caring and domestic responsibilities limit women’s 
ability to participate in the paid labour force equally with men, thus limiting their 
earning potential (Budig, Misra & Boeckmann 2012). However, women’s deeply 
gendered experience of securing an income and parenting has been written out of 
child support policy that describes both parents equally as carers and earners (Child 
Support Agency 2009; Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). The gender 
neutral framing of the policy obscure men’s and women’s differential experience of 
financial autonomy, and in doing so, contributes to women’s subjugated experience. 
Overall, assessments of the 2006–08 reforms have revealed them as being both 
financially (Smyth & Henman 2010) and symbolically (Cook & Natalier 2013) 
advantageous to men at the expense of women, and point to gender inequities within 
the child support scheme. 
One of women’s primary issues within the Child Support Schemes is compliance, as 
was raised during the 2003 Inquiry and identified by the 2005 Taskforce, although 
‘enforcement’ lay outside the Taskforce’s terms of reference. Highlighting the 
significance of this issue for women, the Child Support Agency’s (CSA) (2010a) own 
figures report that less than 50 per cent of non-resident parents paid their full child 
support obligations in 2009, with 12 per cent of those parents paying nothing at all. 
In 2011–12, the Department of Human Services (2012) reported that 24.7 per cent 
of payers with CSA arrangements had outstanding debts, of whom, only 53.6 per 
cent had a payment arrangement in place to resolve it. 
These figures assume that private payments made outside of the purview of the CSA 
are 100 per cent compliant (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). Such an 
assumption obscures the true nature of compliance rates, particularly given that the 
CSA ‘encourages and supports separated parents to independently manage their child 
support responsibilities through Private Collect arrangements’ (Department of 
Human Services 2011, p. 54). Support for private arrangements has increased this 
payment type to 54.2 per cent of the payment caseload (Department of Human 
Services 2012). The promotion of private arrangements with the assumption that 
payers will be 100 per cent compliant renders the problematic nature of low-income 
women’s financial dependency upon their ex–partner invisible. 
In addition to poor or unknown compliance rates, the Ministerial Taskforce noted in 
2005 (p. 60) that ‘a large minority of child support payers do not lodge tax returns’, 
making an assessment of their actual capacity to pay child support impossible and 
likely resulting in an underestimating of their actual income. Similarly, Shephard’s 
(2005) analysis of 1,113 CSA debt files found that 40 per cent of payers with major 
child support debt were also tax return non-filers. The relationships between income 
minimisation (including tax return non–filing) and child support debt have led 
government bodies including the CSA (2010b), Australian Law Reform Commission 
(2011, 2012) and members of parliament (Commonwealth of Australia 2011b) to 
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concur with the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support (2005, p. 96) that ‘tax 
minimisation and avoidance are both significant problems for the Child Support 
Scheme’. Such concerns also led the CSA to introduce the Lodgement Enforcement 
program in the 2010–11 financial year. This program refers customers to the 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) for investigation of tax return non-filing and/or 
attempts to avoid their child support obligations by under-declaring their income 
(Department of Human Services 2011). While the Department of Human Services 
(2012) reports that this process was enacted for all non-lodgers, if this action was 
successful, ATO investigation and associated action would negate the need for the 
2011–12 budget measure under analysis here. It also falls short of addressing tax 
return non-filing and non-compliance for the majority of parents with  
private arrangements. 
There have been few studies of the child support system conducted since the  
2006–08 reforms (see Cook, McKenzie & Knight 2010 for a review). However, many 
commentators, including Labor and Greens senators (Commonwealth of Australia 
2006), suggest that these reforms were disproportionately influenced by and 
benefited the interests of men (Cook & Natalier 2012, 2013; Fehlberg & Maclean 2009).  
Cook and Natalier’s (2013) analysis of the child support reform process highlights 
the differential response to men’s and women’s concerns. While fathers’ rights 
groups pursued a range of amendments to reduce their maximum liabilities and 
enable them to exert greater control over the use of child support transfers, women’s 
primary concerns were with the low value of minimum payments and compliance 
concerns, including child support debt and the minimisation of payer income for 
assessment purposes. Cook and Natalier’s analysis of the ‘trajectories’ of each 2003 
Inquiry recommendation shows that all of men’s concerns were taken up in the 2006 
legislative changes, while only marginal changes were made to minimum payments 
and, as stated previously, child support compliance was excluded from the 2005 
Taskforce terms of reference and 2006–08 reforms. 
These criticisms suggest systemic gender inequities in both the conduct and 
outcomes of the reform process. The financial inequities faced by women are further 
identified by the work of Smyth and Henman (2010, p. 26) whose economic analysis 
of the reforms identify that ‘non-resident parents (mostly fathers) are more likely 
than resident parents (mostly mothers) to experience net gains under the new 
Scheme’ and that low-income families and resident parents with part-time or casual 
employment ‘appear to be among those most likely to be hit’. Taken together, the net 
losses experienced by women as a result of the reforms and the failure of the process 
to address income minimisation and poor compliance has resulted in a system that 
unfairly burdens women as they seek to provide for their children post-separation.  
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The most recent budget measure amendment to the child support formula builds on 
what have already been identified as gendered policy outcomes (Smyth & Henman 
2010; Cook & Natalier 2013). Further, in child support policymaking to date, 
reference to ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ have been replaced with statements about 
‘parents’, ‘payers’ and ‘payees’—done in part to recognise the increasing proportion 
of men who are resident or shared care parents. Such gender neutral language, rather 
than providing gender equality, obfuscates the operation of gendered power within 
and beyond the couple relationship (Natalier & Hewitt 2010; Neale & Smart 2002)—
power relationships that are particularly relevant to parents who manage their 
arrangements privately, as these arrangements are made without the protection of 
CSA assessment and enforcement. 
In light of these issues, in this paper I examine the 2011–12 budget measure and 
identify how, for the small number of women affected, the change in income 
assessment increases women’s reliance on payments from their ex-partner. I contend 
that while the number of women affected is small, the issues raised here expose 
pervasive gendered inequities in the distribution of risk and responsibility in the child 
support system, that disproportionately disadvantage women, in particular the 
system’s most vulnerable women, in relation to men. To begin this analysis, I first 
provide a brief overview of recent reforms to the Australian child support system, 
focusing on the 2011–12 budget measure in particular. 
A measure to ‘strengthen child support compliance’ 
In order to make a more accurate assessment of non-resident parents’ capacity to pay, 
the federal government recently introduced a change to the way child support 
obligations are calculated for tax return non-filers. This amendment was listed in the 
budget papers under the heading of ‘strengthening compliance for child support’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2011a, p. 197). Previously, payers who had not filed a 
tax return had their taxable income for the purpose of a child support assessment 
calculated as 2/3 male total average weekly earnings (MTAWE). Based on Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2011b) figures at the time of writing, this is estimated at $919.47 
per week ($47,812.44 annually), and is considered by the federal government to result 
in a likely underestimation of the non-resident parents’ income and thus child 
support obligations (Commonwealth of Australia 2011a). As the government 
outlined during the passage of the budget measure, since 1 July 2008 there has been a 
570 per cent increase in the use of the 2/3 MTAWE default where the parent’s 
previous taxable income had been higher, although it is not stated how many parents 
would be affected by this reform (Commonwealth of Australia 2011b). The most 
recent Department of Human Services (2012) figures indicate that in the 2010–11 
financial year, 125,418 cases of tax-return non-filing were referred for tax-lodgement 
enforcement, with a further 81,500 referred in 2011–12. Again, these figures do not 
include parents with private arrangements. 
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Following the enactment of the 2011–12 budget measure, a child support estimate 
based on the 2/3 MTAWE was replaced by an assessment of the payer parent’s last 
known taxable income, indexed by growth in average wages during the period since 
their last return. This change in income assessment applies only to those parents who 
are obliged to pay child support, who have failed to lodge a tax return in the previous 
two years or more, and whose previous tax return reported an income more than 2/3 
MTAWE. According to the government’s explanatory memorandum: 
this rule will remove the unintended incentive for parents on higher 
incomes to benefit from a lower child support assessment based on 2/3 
MTAWE by failing to lodge a tax return to have their current income 
assessed by the ATO (Parliament of Australia 2011, p. 35). 
Given the above criteria, only a proportion of non-resident parents who fail to lodge 
tax returns will be affected by this reform and only a proportion of these will be 
financially motivated to lodge a tax return if their estimated income then exceeds 
their actual income. However, the amount of money to be saved by government is 
significant—and will be recouped from reduced Family Tax Benefits to resident 
parents (Commonwealth of Australia 2011a). It is government’s contention that the 
money to be saved will be funded by increased transfers from non-resident to 
resident households. While the government’s assumption is that non-resident parents 
will transfer a greater proportion of their income as child support, the co-occurrence 
of child support debt and tax return non-filing (Shephard 2005), is likely to create an 
unintended consequence. As payers who fail to lodge tax returns are also likely not to 
pay child support, women will bear these costs; or the government’s forecast savings 
will be depleted as they compensate women for unpaid child support. While the 
government’s intention regarding this budget measure may have been to improve 
child support outcomes for recipient parents and their children, the following 
analysis reveals that the policy response fails to address the underlying issue of child 
support non-compliance and in doing so buttresses men’s financial autonomy. 
Methods 
In order to demonstrate the effect of this budget measure on the finances and 
financial autonomy of low-income women, Centrelink’s (2011b) online Family 
Assistance and Child Support estimator was used to derive child support, rent 
assistance, Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B payment estimates for a resident 
parent whose partner’s annual income was calculated as 2/3 MTAWE ($47,812.44), 
and salaries estimated using the new formula at $5,000 increments from $50,000 to 
$100,000. Child support, Family Tax Benefit and rent assistance estimates were 
calculated for a single, resident parent in receipt of Parenting Payment (Single) and 
rent assistance for a $200 per week property with one child aged five who does not 
attend child care. 
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It is impossible to construct a profile that represents every child support recipient. 
However, the most recently published data on the family and income profiles of 
child support payers and payees (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Family and Community Affairs 2003) indicates that there is an average of 1.5 
children per case, and that 74 per cent of single parents have incomes below $20,000 
per annum. Such families would be entitled to Parenting Payment (Single), Family 
Tax and rent assistance benefits and as such the constructed profile is deemed to 
provide an adequate approximation to demonstrate the effects of this policy on 
similar recipients. Such generic child support profiles were employed in Smyth and 
Henman’s (2010) modelling of the economic impact of the 2006–08 reforms and in 
the 2005 Ministerial Taskforce report. Further, one child has been chosen for the 
profile modelled here for simplicity. According to the child support formula, where 
there are multiple children, the percentage of care, and thus child support liability for 
each child may differ, affecting the total liability. 
In the scenario modelled here, the non-resident parent was defined as not having any 
other dependent children, or receiving a government benefit. While the treatment of 
second families was an issue for discussion in the 2003 Inquiry report, and the 
subject of a recommendation that was later enacted in the 2005 Taskforce report, no 
data are provided regarding the frequency of payer parents with new or step children 
as dependents. As the representativeness of the profile cannot be determined, a payer 
with no additional children has been used for simplicity. These calculations would 
not apply to payers with new dependent children, as their total child support 
liabilities would be reduced. 
Calculations were made for a non-resident parent with contact for 10 per cent, 20 per 
cent and 40 per cent of nights per year. These percentages are situated in the mid- 
range of various child support and Family Tax Benefit care thresholds, including ‘less 
than regular care’ (less than 14 per cent of nights), ‘regular care’ (14 per cent to 34 
per cent of nights) and ‘shared care’ (more than 35 per cent of nights) (Ministerial 
Taskforce on Child Support 2005). 
The difference in women’s total income using the 2/3 MTAWE default and the 
estimated non-resident parent income was calculated, as was the percentage of 
income that women would receive from each income source. 
The costs to low income women 
In all but three of the income scenarios modelled here, resident parents’ total income 
was less than when calculated using the 2/3 MTAWE proxy. Consistent with the 
policy intent, the net impact on resident parents was negligible, as the greatest loss 
experienced by resident parents was $0.11 per week when the non-resident parent 
earned $80,000 per annum and had ‘regular care’, defined as between 14 per cent and 
34 per cent of nights (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). 
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While the total amount of money that resident parents were entitled to did not 
change substantially, the proportion of income derived from each source did (Figures 
1–3). Whereas, in this scenario, child support contributed a small proportion (5.6 per 
cent–7.9 per cent) of the resident parent’s household income using the 2/3 MTAWE 
proxy, the budget measure increased the contribution of child support to over 10 per 
cent of household income in 70 per cent of the scenarios modelled here; and to over 
15 per cent of household income in 27 per cent of scenarios. 
 
Figure 1. Sources of resident parent income where a non-resident parent has 
‘shared care’ (40 per cent of nights) 
 
Figure 2. Sources of resident parent income where a non-resident parent has 
‘regular care’ (20 per cent of nights) 
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Figure 3. Sources of resident parent income where a non-resident parent has ‘less 
than regular care’ (10 per cent of nights) 
 
The change in income distribution was particularly significant where non-resident 
parents had ‘less than regular care’ (Figure 3), as the proportion of income derived 
from child support in this scenario increased from 7.9 per cent to more than 20 per 
cent where their ex-partner was assessed as earning in excess of $95,000 per annum. 
Again, these results are entirely consistent with the policy intent. As this budget 
measure intends (Commonwealth of Australia 2011a), men are being required to 
provide an increasing proportion of women’s income. As estimated non-resident 
parent income rises, the amount of child support they are liable to pay also increases. 
While there are no significant direct ‘costs’ to low-income women as a result of this 
budget measure, a situation exists where there is the potential for substantial 
unintended financial costs for the small number of women affected. By conducting 
this analysis, however, I am not suggesting that there should be an economic ‘clean 
break’ where women should rely solely on the State for financial support post 
separation. This proposal would be financially unviable, is contrary to the aims of the 
Child Support Scheme (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005) and would 
erode the important role fathers play in the economic lives of children. Rather, I am 
suggesting that if an increased proportion of women’s income is to be derived from 
fathers, safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that women actually receive this 
money and that women are able to use it to support their children as they see fit. 
However, when we are focusing specifically on a payer population who have failed to 
lodge tax returns, a behaviour that is often associated with child support non-
payment, women’s increased reliance on child support income is problematic. A suite 
of gendered power dynamics may be operating here, including child support non-
compliance and tax-return non-filing being used as a means of financial abuse 
(Patrick, Cook & McKenzie 2008). This reform offers inadequate protection to 
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women who have experienced family violence, as the burden of responsibility to 
remedy the situation is placed upon the victim. The gendered nature of the child 
support system renders these processes invisible and, in doing so, creates a situation 
where existing gender hierarchies are perpetuated. 
In light of the increase in the percentage of income that women can expect from 
their previously non-ATO-compliant ex-partners, two issues raise immediate concern 
about the redistribution of the sources of women’s income; namely poor child 
support enforcement (Child Support Agency 2010a) and the 2006–08 reform that 
increased the proportion of child support that can be earmarked by non-resident 
parents for ‘prescribed purposes’ (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). 
Given that this reform was promoted as a measure to improve child support 
compliance, this issue will be addressed first, followed by an examination of the 
implications of women’s increased reliance on income received directly from their 
ex-partners. 
Child support compliance and men’s financial autonomy 
While this budget measure is framed as a measure to strengthen compliance, I argue 
that it is a version of compliance that protects men’s financial autonomy and instead 
increases the demands placed on women, as I outline in the following section. In this 
section, I focus on how this budget measure implicitly condones men’s non-
compliance with both child support legislation and the ATO. While ‘payers under a 
child support assessment are required to lodge a tax return, regardless of other 
exemptions to tax return lodgement that might apply’ (Ministerial Taskforce on Child 
Support 2005, p. 173), the significance of payers’ non-compliance with the ATO is 
downplayed by this budget measure and supporting CSA documentation (Child 
Support Agency 2010b). Rather than enforcing men’s requirement to lodge tax 
returns, the budget measure circumvents the tax system when making a 
determination of child support liability; buttressing men’s financial autonomy and 
freedom from regulatory authority. 
While this budget measure seeks to make men pay more child support, men remain 
equally free to ‘choose’ whether to comply with the ATO, and then whether to 
comply with their child support obligations. While non-compliance with the ATO 
and CSA is contrary to Australian tax and family law, in practice, non-compliance is 
inadvertently legitimised, as there would be no need for this budget measure if all 
complied. Further, men’s choice regarding whether to comply or not is maintained as 
it is only when men’s estimated income is more than their actual income that they 
will have a compelling incentive to file. In all other cases, it would remain financially 
beneficially for them not to do so. However, men’s ‘choice’ whether to subject their 
finances to the scrutiny of the ATO and CSA stands in stark contrast to the 
experience of the vast number of low-income child support recipients. 
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Increasing the regulation of women’s financial lives 
For low-income women, their FTB(A) entitlement is based, among other things, on 
the amount of child support that the CSA assesses that they are entitled to, rather 
than the amount agreed on by the parents or the amount received by the payee. The 
CSA (2009) notes, however, that if the entitled amount is not received by the payee 
parent, only the received proportion of the assessed amount is used in Centrelink’s 
FTB(A) calculation. As a result, payee parents who experience a shortfall in child 
support income should receive an increase in FTB(A). Once again, this 
compensation inadvertently legitimises men’s non-compliance with their child 
support obligations. In addition, such compensation will limit the full extent of the 
government’s forecast savings as a result of this budget measure. Again, while I do 
not suggest that this economic safety net for women is removed, the assumptions 
embedded within the child support system, such as the condoning of men’s non-
compliance and the buttressing of men’s financial autonomy, need to be identified 
and addressed. Within this counter-productive system of compensation, several 
issues threaten women’s actual receipt of Centrelink’s compensatory payments. 
While FTB(A) compensation is possible, three potential issues have been identified 
where payees with child support underpayments may not seek increased benefits. 
These include: (1) payees not knowing that reporting child support underpayment 
can result in increased FTB(A) payments; (2) the potential for FTB(A) over-payment 
and subsequent Centrelink debt recovery if child support arrears are subsequently 
paid; and (3) fear of repercussions from the payer parent for reporting an 
underpayment. Each of these scenarios, as outlined below, may contribute to payee 
parents’ acceptance of less child support and FTB(A) than they are entitled to. In all 
three cases, men are afforded autonomy over their finances and obligations (Diduck 
1995) whereas women’s lives are increasingly regulated as they are required either to 
comply with increased Centrelink surveillance or forego their FTB(A) entitlements.  
I argue that increased government scrutiny should be placed on the non-compliant 
party, in this case men who do not lodge tax returns, rather than women who seek to 
collect their statutory child support entitlements on behalf of their children. Each of 
the above issues will now be discussed in turn. 
First, it cannot be assumed that payee parents will be aware that FTB(A) entitlements 
can be increased due to child support underpayments. As research by Patrick, Cook 
and McKenzie (2008) highlights, low-income child support recipients may be 
unaware of the interactions between the child support and welfare benefit systems. 
Centrelink does not specifically list a change in child support payments as a reason 
why recipients should inform them that their circumstances have changed 
(Centrelink 2011c). Further, the variability of FTB(A) payments due to child support 
underpayment is not documented on the Centrelink website (Centrelink 2011a) and 
the only information provided by Centrelink about FTB(A) payment adjustment 
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pertains to the recipient’s annual filing of a tax return; a filing that is not framed as 
‘optional’, as my analysis of men’s compulsion to file seems to suggest. 
Further, Centrelink’s ‘one-stop shop’ for payments and services, where ‘the onus [is] 
on Centrelink to match the circumstances of the customer with the products and 
services that have been legislated and made available by client departments’ 
(Centrelink 2005, p. 2) and customers being required simply to inform Centrelink 
when their circumstances change (Centrelink 2010), creates a system where recipients 
may unwittingly act in ways that are not in their best interests (Cook & Marjoribanks 
2005; McKenzie & Cook 2007). As a result, the most vulnerable child support 
recipients are often the least well placed to ensure their correct entitlements are 
received. The limits of this self-advocacy approach for Centrelink customers in 
general have been explored by Sleep (2002) in her examination of the dramatic 
increase in Centrelink ‘breaches’ from 1996 to 2001 and the corresponding 
stagnation of formal appeal rates across the entire Centrelink payment population. 
One explanation Sleep (2002, p. 11) puts forward is that ‘the low appeal rates reflect 
the government’s targeting of the most vulnerable people, because they are the least 
likely to have the skills and resources necessary to navigate the appeals process’. 
Similar processes may prevent low-income single parents from advocating for their 
full FTB(A) entitlements when shortfalls in child support payments are experienced. 
Second, while the circumstances under which FTB(A) payments can be increased are 
not well publicised by Centrelink, information highlighting that over-payments due 
to income underestimation would need to be paid back and could result in fraud 
charges is prominent (Centrelink 2011d). While payees who report child support 
underpayments are entitled to receive a FTB(A) increase (Child Support Agency 
2009), by seeking to increase their FTB(A) income at the time a child support 
shortfall was experienced, payees may be required to repay this money if child 
support arrears are later received and not reported to Centrelink as ‘arrears’ from 
previous years. While Centrelink and the CSA state that arrears received are taken 
into consideration and applied to the financial year in which they were owed, the 
onus is once again on some of the system’s most vulnerable recipients to navigate 
this complex policy system and advocate for their full entitlements. The same 
barriers as outlined above apply. As a result, while the payee has no control over 
whether child support arrears are received, they bear the responsibility for any 
FTB(A) overpayment that may occur if they fail to correctly inform Centrelink. 
Women then also face the financial and social sanctions that are imposed for an 
unwarranted FTB payment. As previous research has identified that avoiding 
Centrelink surveillance is important to welfare recipients (Daniels 2003; Ferguson 
2010), the resultant government scrutiny may lead payees to underreport child 
support arrears in order to avoid FTB(A) over-payment and subsequent debt-
recovery. The proportion of women who would take this option, however, is 
currently unknown. 
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The surveillance of those who receive FTB(A) overpayments due to the 
unanticipated payment of child support arrears, reflects a social (and in this case 
gendered) division in government scrutiny. Such a division has also been identified 
by Henman and Marston (2008) in their analysis of welfare and tax surveillance. Here 
they identified extreme disparities in the level of debt recovery conducted by 
Centrelink for over- or ineligible payment compared to the ATO’s efforts for tax 
evasion. These same issues play out in the child support context where, despite a 
legal requirement to file tax returns, payers who fail to do so and make late or no 
child support payments receive less scrutiny than payees who seek increased FTB(A) 
payments due to child support arrears. However, to this end, the CSA’s new 
enforcement program goes some way to address this imbalance (Child Support 
Agency 2010b), and future evaluations of the associated ATO enforcement program, 
including the net financial gains to resident families, are welcome. 
Third, as suggested in Branigan’s (2005) examination of financial abuse, and 
reiterated by Patrick, Cook and colleagues (Patrick, Cook & Taket 2007; Patrick, 
Cook & McKenzie 2008) and the Australian Law Reform Commission (2011, 2012), 
the minimisation and non-payment of child support is a strategy sometimes 
employed by payer parents to perpetuate financial abuse beyond the couple 
relationship. Further, it has been suggested that women may be reluctant to report 
child support underpayments for fear of retribution from their ex-partner. It is 
currently unknown what percentage of payees with child support debts fail to report 
payment shortfalls to Centrelink, although research on financial abuse (Patrick et al. 
2008; Branigan 2005) suggests that this unintended outcome may be a very real 
possibility for some of the system’s most vulnerable recipients. This issue was 
recently taken up by the Australian Law Reform Commission (2011, 2012) in their 
examination of family violence and family law. However, similar to the 2005 
Ministerial Taskforce review, child support enforcement lay outside the commission’s 
terms of reference. More work is needed to examine the gendered nature of child 
support and family law reform processes more broadly (Bacchi 1999; Graycar 2000, 
2005), perhaps in the form of a specific inquiry into child support compliance, which 
has been overlooked in official reform processes to date. 
By examining the sites where policy structures may create barriers for women, I am 
not suggesting that women are victims of the child support scheme or lack any 
agency to navigate the child support or Centrelink systems. Rather, in this article I 
seek specifically to describe the structural forces that shape women’s experiences and 
the opportunities for action that are enabled or constrained within these policy 
contexts. As this analysis shows, there are numerous sites where men’s agency is 
fostered. Unfortunately, the agency men are afforded serves to subvert legal 
requirements such as tax return lodgement and child support payment. On the 
contrary, women’s opportunities for agency within this system extend only to 
whether or not they choose to pursue their legal entitlements when these have been 
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denied. Women in this instance have the choice to pursue their child support debts, 
or ‘give up’. As Hayley McKenzie (2012) reported in her recent doctoral thesis, 
women in her study often accepted ‘unacceptable’ child support arrangements, such 
as irregular, partial or absent payments, as the emotional and time costs required to 
pursue their entitlements outweighed the possible financial gain. As such, in this 
analysis I seek to identify some of the structural barriers that create conditions where 
women find it easier to ‘give up’ rather than fight for their child support payments, 
and the financial implications that they experience as a result. 
Prescribed payments and men’s financial authority 
While the previous section described how the 2011–12 budget measure privileges 
men’s financial autonomy and subjects women to increased government scrutiny, this 
section examines how the budget measure promotes men’s financial authority over 
the affairs of women and children beyond the couple relationship. While this increase 
in financial authority is not a direct result of this budget measure, the financial 
implications of the measure and their interaction with other child support policy 
conditions creates a scenario where financial authority is distributed along gender 
lines. To examine these relationships, this section focuses on the interaction of two 
related issues that produce or exacerbate women’s financial vulnerability, namely the 
increased proportion of income women now derive from their ex-partner and the 
2008 legislative change that enables men able to contribute up to 30 per cent of their 
child support obligations for prescribed purposes, ‘regardless of the wishes of the 
payee parent’ (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005, p. 186). 
In light of reduced rent assistance and FTB(A) payments, in cases where men 
exercise their option to prescribe women’s expenditure, women are left with an 
increasingly small amount of money to spend at their discretion. This is particularly 
worrisome for low-income women, as research has shown that women already tend 
to prioritise spending on children (Pahl 2000, 2005). Reducing the amount of money 
women have available to make spending choices may undermine the intent of this 
policy to improve children’s standard of living.  
For women with concerns over family violence, the increased reliance on an ex-
partner is particularly worrying, as it provides greater scope for men to exert abusive 
influence over the affairs of their ex-partners through the withholding of child 
support or the manipulative use of the 30 per cent prescribed payment option. Given 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman reported to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (2012) that a high proportion of CSA customers in the Child Support 
Family Violence Risk Identification Pilot program identified safety concerns, 
increasing the proportion of income derived from their ex-partner and the control 
payers have over the use of this income, may be counter-productive. This is 
particularly the case for payees whose ex-partner has not lodged a tax return, as this 
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may be a deliberate means of perpetuating financial abuse (Australian Law Reform 
Commission 2011; Branigan 2005). 
Conclusions 
This paper examined the 2011–12 budget measure, which aims to more accurately 
assess child support payer income, in light of the implications for low-income 
women. An analysis of the economic impact on payees revealed that, as intended, the 
revision was unlikely to have a significant financial impact on women and children. 
However, an analysis of child support compliance through a feminist lens revealed 
indirect financial impacts of the decision, which may substantially change women’s 
finances. These changes have different outcomes for men’s and women’s financial 
autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Men’s financial autonomy is buttressed as this reform 
frames the ‘problem’ to be solved as the cost of family benefits to the Treasury rather 
than men’s compliance with the tax or child support systems. Women’s autonomy, 
on the other hand, is limited to reacting to underpayments and navigating the CSA 
and Centrelink bureaucracies. While the state provides the majority of low-income 
women’s income, and has the capacity to compensate for un-received child support 
payments, the inadequacy of welfare benefits and the burden placed on women to 
navigate these complex systems means that low-income women’s financial autonomy 
is undermined. 
In 2005, the Ministerial Taskforce review into the child support scheme argued for 
changes that provided ‘fairness’ to both parents. Recent analyses of these reforms, 
however, have identified that the subsequent revisions were far from fair as they 
disproportionately favoured the financial interest of men (Smyth & Henman 2010) 
and resulted in policy changes that sidelined the concerns of women (Cook & 
Natalier 2013). This latest measure follows a similarly gendered trajectory. The 
reported aim of the budget measure was to improve child support compliance and 
improve financial outcomes for children. However, the result is that women whose 
partners were previously non-compliant with the ATO will be increasingly reliant on 
financial support from their ex-partners and less able to decide how this money can 
be spent. Given poor child support compliance rates that are often correlated with 
tax return non-filing (Shepherd 2005), perhaps indicating deliberate financial abuse, 
women in this situation may indeed be financially disadvantaged as a result of this 
reform. The unintended effect of this budget measure strengthens the criticism that 
there are indeed systemic gender inequities embedded in the Child Support Scheme. 
While the 2006–08 reforms were preceded by a decade of reviews, it may be time 
once again to examine the Scheme, this time with an explicit focus on gender, the 
role the child support scheme plays in the structure of gender relations, and how 
further reforms could enhance gender equity. It is widely acknowledged that men’s 
rights groups were particularly vocal in calling for the 2006–08 reforms and the 
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preceding reviews (Smyth & Henman 2010). During these inquiry processes, men’s 
claims included greater financial and care giving responsibility; which are laudable 
aspirations. However, equal parenting outcomes are impossible if employment and 
care-giving inequities continue to exist. The policy and social challenges posed by 
these inequities are beyond the scope of the Child Support Scheme, but this does not 
preclude action to redress the power imbalance that currently exists. 
REFERENCES 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011a, Family Characteristics, Australia 2009–10, Cat. no. 4442.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011b, Average Weekly Earnings (February 2011), Cat. no. 6302.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
Australian Law Reform Commission 2011, ‘Family violence and Commonwealth laws: Child 
support and family assistance’, Issues Paper 38, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Australian Law Reform Commission 2012, ‘Family Violence and Commonwealth Laws –
Improving Legal Frameworks’, ALRC Report 117, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Bacchi, C. 1999, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems, SAGE,  
Thousand Oaks. 
Baxter, J. 2006, Patterns of time use over the lifecourse: What we know and what we need to 
know, paper presented at the Time and Gender Seminar, University of New South Wales 
[Online], Available: 
http://intlstudies.arts.unsw.edu.au/media/File/timeuse_papers_baxter.pdf  [2013, Jun 8]. 
Baxter, J. 2010, ‘An exploration of the timing and nature of parental time with 4–5 year olds 
using Australian children’s time use data’, Research Paper No. 45, Australian Institute of 
Family Studies, Melbourne. 
Boyd, S.B. 2003, ‘Walking the line: Canada’s response to child custody law reform 
discourses’, Canadian Family Law Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 397–423. 
Boyd, S.B. 2004, ‘Demonizing mothers: Fathers’ rights discourses and child custody law 
reform processes’, Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 52–74. 
Boyd, S.B., & Young, C. 2002, ‘Who influences family law reform? Discourses on 
motherhood and fatherhood in legislative reform debates in Canada’, Studies in Law, 
Politics and Society, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 43–75. 
Branigan, E. 2005, His Money or Our Money? Financial Abuse of Women in Intimate Partner 
Relationships, Coburg Brunswick Community Legal and Financial Counselling Centre,  
Inc, Melbourne. 
Budig, M.J., Misra, J. & Boeckmann, I. 2012, ‘The motherhood penalty in cross-national 
perspective: The importance of work-family policies and cultural attitudes’, Social Politics, 
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 163–193. 
Caruana, C. 2007, ‘Unwrapping the family law reform package’, Family Matters, no. 77,  
pp. 43–47. 
 COOK: CHILD SUPPORT COMPLIANCE 61 
Centrelink 2005, Centrelink Information: A Guide to Payments and Services 2005–06, Government 
of Australia, Canberra. 
Centrelink 2010, Centrelink’s Customer Service Charter, Government of Australia, Canberra. 
Centrelink 2011a, Payment Rates, Government of Australia, Canberra [Online], Available: 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/payments/ftb_a_rates.htm [2011, 
Jun 23].  
Centrelink 2011b, Family Assistance / Child Support Estimator, Government of Australia, 
Canberra [Online], Available: 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/RateEstimatorsWeb/publicUserCombinedStart.do [2011, 
Jun 23].  
Centrelink 2011c, What You Need to Tell Us, Government of Australia, Canberra [Online], 
Available: http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/factors/tell_us.htm [2011, 
Jun 23].  
Centrelink 2011d, Change of Circumstances, Government of Australia, Canberra [Online], 
Available: 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/payments/ftb_circumstances.htm 
[2011, Jun 23]. 
Chesters, J., Baxter, B., & Western, M. 2009, ‘Paid and unpaid work in Australian households: 
Trends in the gender division of labour, 1986–2005’, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, 
vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 89–107. 
Child Support Agency 2009, The Parent’s Guide to Child Support, Government of Australia, 
Canberra.  
Child Support Agency 2010a, Facts and Figures 2008–09, Child Support Agency, Belconnen. 
Child Support Agency 2010b, CSA: Supporting Parents to Meet their Child Support Responsibilities: 
2010–2012 Compliance Program, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Collier, R. 1994, ‘The campaign against the Child Support Act: “Errant fathers” and “family 
men”’, Family Law, July, pp. 384–387. 
Collier, R. 2006, ‘“The outlaw fathers fight back”: Fathers’ rights groups, fathers’ justice and 
the politics of family law reform – reflections on the UK perspective’, in Fathers’ Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective, eds R. Collier & S. Sheldon, Hartland 
Publishing, Portland. 
Collier, R. 2010, ‘Masculinities, law and personal life: Towards a new framework for 
understanding men, law, and gender’, Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 
431–475. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2006, Child Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child 
Support Scheme – New Formula and Other Measures) Bill 2006: Additional comments by Labor and 
Greens Senators, Government of Australia, Canberra. 
Commonwealth of Australia 2011a, ‘Budget measures’, Budget Paper No. 2 2011–2012, 
Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 
62 AUSTRALIAN REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
Commonwealth of Australia 2011b, Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
and Other Legislation Amendment (Further Election Commitments and Other Measures) Bill 2011: 
Second Reading Speech, The Senate, Canberra. 
Cook, K. & Marjoribanks, T. 2005, ‘Low-income women’s experiences of social citizenship 
and social exclusion’, Just Policy, no. 38, pp. 13–19. 
Cook, K., McKenzie, H., & Knight, T. 2011, ‘Child support research in Australia: A critical 
review’, Journal of Family Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 110–125. 
Cook, K. & Natalier, K. 2012, He said, she said: Gender interests and the use of public 
testimony in the child support policy making process, paper presented to The Australian 
Sociological Association Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, November 27. 
Cook, K. & Natalier, K. 2013, ‘The gendered nature of Australia’s child support policy 
reforms’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 28–50. 
Craig, L. & Mullan, K. 2010, ‘Parenthood, gender and work-family time in the United States, 
Australia, Italy, France, and Denmark’, Journal of Marriage and Family, vol. 72, no. 5, pp. 
1344–1361. 
Daniels, J. 2003, What sort of help is that? Problematic support for sole mothers returning to 
study, paper presented at the Forum for the Advancement of Continuing Education, 
University of Stirling, Stirling [Online], Available: 
http://www.face.stir.ac.uk/documents/Paper077Daniels.pdf [2011, Jul 1]. 
Department of Human Services 2011, Annual Report 2010–2011, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra. 
Department of Human Services 2012, Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B, Government of 
Australia [Online], Available: 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/family-tax-benefit-
part-a-part-b [2012, Nov 20]. 
Diduck, A. 1995, ‘The unmodified family: The Child Support Act and the construction of 
legal subjects’, Journal of Law and Society, vol. 22, pp. 527–548. 
Fehlberg, B., & Maclean, M. 2009, ‘Child support policy in Australia and the United 
Kingdom: Changing priorities but a similar tough deal for children?’ International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family, vol. 23, pp. 1–24. 
Ferguson, H. 2010, Rationalising Mutual Obligation: Income Support Discourses during the Howard 
Years, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Canberra, Canberra. 
Gerhard, U. 2001, Towards a Feminist Theory of Law from a European Perspective, New Rutgers 
University Press, Brunswick. 
Gittins, D. 1993, The Family in Question: Changing Households and Familiar Ideology, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Graycar, R. 2000, ‘Law reform by frozen chook: Family law reform for the new millennium?’ 
Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 24, pp. 737–755. 
 COOK: CHILD SUPPORT COMPLIANCE 63 
Graycar, R. 2005, ‘Frozen chooks revisited: The challenge of changing law/s’ in Changing Law: 
Rights, Regulation and Reconciliation, eds R. Hunter & M. Keane, Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, pp. 49–76. 
Henman, P. & Marston, G. 2008, ‘The social distribution of welfare surveillance’, Journal of 
Social Policy, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 187–205. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs 2003, 
Every Picture Tells a Story: Report on the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of 
Family Separation, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
James, C. 2005, ‘Winners and losers: The father factor in Australian child custody law’, 
Australian and New Zealand Law and History E-journal, pp. 1–26 [Online], Available 
http://www.anzlhsejournal.auckland.ac.nz/pdfs_2005/James.pdf [2011, Jul 1]. 
International Network of Child Support Scholars 2012, Glossary, INCSS [Online], Available 
http://incss.org [2012, Nov 20]. 
McKenzie, H. 2012, Accepting the Unacceptable: Patriarchal Hegemony and Child Support 
Arrangements, Unpublished PhD thesis [Online] Available: 
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30048441 [2012, Nov 20]. 
McKenzie, H. & Cook, K. 2007, ‘The influence of child support and welfare on single parent 
families’, Just Policy, no. 45, pp. 21–29. 
Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005, In the Best Interests of Children – Reforming the 
Child Support Scheme, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Natalier, K., & Hewitt, B. 2010, ‘‘It’s not just about the money’: Non-resident fathers’ 
perspectives on paying child support’, Sociology, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 489–505. 
Neale, B. & Smart, C. 2002, ‘Caring, earning and changing: Parenthood and employment 
after divorce’, in Analysing Families: Morality and Rationality in Policy and Practice, eds A.H. 
Carling, S. Duncan & R. Edwards, Routledge, London, pp. 183–198. 
Pahl, J. 2000, ‘The gendering of spending within households’, Radical Statistics, vol. 75,  
pp. 38–48. 
Pahl, J. 2005, ‘Individualisation in couple finances: Who pays for the children?’, Social Policy 
and Society, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 381–392. 
Parliament of Australia 2011, Families, Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and 
Other Legislation Amendment (Further Election Commitments and Other Measures) Bill 2011: 
Explanatory Memorandum, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Patrick, R., Cook, K. & McKenzie, H. 2008, ‘Domestic violence and the exemption from 
seeking child support: Providing safety or legitimating ongoing poverty and fear’, Social 
Policy and Administration, vol. 42, no. 7, pp. 749–767. 
Patrick, R., Cook, K. & Taket, A. 2007, ‘Multiple barriers to obtaining child support: 
Experiences of women leaving violent partners’, Just Policy, no. 45, pp. 30–37. 
Shephard, A. 2005, ‘The Australian Child Support Agency: Debt study and follow-up on 
intensive debt collection processes’, Family Court Review, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 387–401. 
64 AUSTRALIAN REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
Sleep, L. 2002, ‘Pulling up their breaches: An analysis of Centrelink breach numbers and 
formal appeal rates’, Journal of Economic and Social Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, article 5 [Online], 
Available: http://epubs.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol6/iss2/5 [2011, Jul 1]. 
Smyth, B., & Henman, P. 2010, ‘The distributional and financial impacts of the new 
Australian child support scheme: A ‘before and day-after reform’ comparison of assessed 
liability’, Journal of Family Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 5–32. 
Swan, W. 2011, ‘Budget Speech 2011–12’, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Vogler, C. 1998, ‘Money in the household: Some underlying issues of power’, The Sociological 
Review, vol. 46, pp. 687–713. 
Yeatman, A. 1990, Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: Essays on the Contemporary Australian State, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney. 
